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Pain Mismanagement:  
The Opioid Problem in the NFL 
Dylan McGowan* 
 
In 2014 and 2015, two groups of former National Football 
League (“NFL”) players brought lawsuits against the NFL for its 
handling and distribution of opioids and other dangerous pain- 
killers. While neither lawsuit has succeeded in its goal of address-
ing the painkiller problem, they brought to light the broken pain  
management culture of the NFL and the health risks these medica-
tions pose to both active and former players. Addressing the opioid 
problem should be a top priority for the NFL and the National  
Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”). This Note exam-
ines the pain management crisis in the NFL, and analyzes the  
two player lawsuits, illustrating the difficulty players face in ob-
taining relief in the courts. Additionally, this Note discusses the  
joint NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and 
demonstrates the NFLPA’s need to negotiate for changes in that 
agreement to secure relief for former players and protect active 
players from any further harm. 
 
 
 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2021; B.A. Government & 
Politics, University of Maryland, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Wendy Luftig for 
her guidance. I would also like to thank the IPLJ Editorial staff for their hard work and 
feedback, particularly Senior Research & Writing Editor Sara Mazurek. Finally, thank you 
to my friends and family for their support and advice, especially my girlfriend, Chandler 
Sella, for her continuous encouragement throughout the writing process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hall of Famer Richard Dent played fifteen seasons in the  
National Football League (“NFL”) from 1983 to 1997.1 During his 
time with the Bears, he was named a First-Team All-Pro2 and Most 
Valuable Player of Super Bowl XX;3 he was additionally named to 
the Pro-Bowl four times4 and, in 1985, led the NFL in sacks.5  
Unbeknownst to most, Dent had such success in part due to a  
steady supply of painkillers to keep him performing for his team.6 
The emphasis on painkiller use in the NFL to ensure on-field  
production was made clear to Dent early in his career.7 During a 
preseason practice prior to his 1983 rookie season, Dent tore his 
hamstring, as well as tendons and ligaments in his ankle.8 Barely 
able to walk, he received anti-inflammatories and painkillers, and 
 
1 Sheilla Dingus, Are Prescription Painkillers an NFL Sanctioned PED?, ADVOC. FOR 
FAIRNESS IN SPORTS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://advocacyforfairnessinsports.org/current-
litigation/nfl-painkiller-lawsuits/are-prescription-painkillers-an-nfl-sanctioned-ped/; 
[https://perma.cc/6WLE-LUCG]; Richard Dent, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, 
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/D/DentRi00.htm [https://perma.cc/5D7P-
YYYS]. 
2 All-Pro, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 14, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Pro 
[https://perma.cc/5S9K-49AQ]. All-Pro is a distinction awarded to the best players at each 
position during a given season. Id. 
3 Super Bowl Most Valuable Player Award, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Super_Bowl_Most_Valuable_Player_Award [https://perma.cc/3G4Z-R6RT]. The 
Most Valuable Player award is given to the player voted to have had an important impact 
in the Super Bowl. It is often given to the player deemed to have performed the best during 
the game. Id. 
4 See generally Tom Sheen, What is the Pro Bowl? Everything You Need to Know About 
NFL Version of All-Star Game, THE SUN (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/ 
sport/5377761/what-is-the-pro-bowl-nfl-all-star-game/ [https://perma.cc/H5FV-KEJM]. 
5 See generally Sack, SPORTS LINGO, https://www.sportslingo.com/sports-
glossary/s/sack/ [https://perma.cc/GP49-2EMY]; NFL Sacks Year-by-Year Leaders (Since 
1982), PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, https://www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
leaders/sacks_year_by_year.htm. [https://perma.cc/ZH3T-8YWZ]. A sack is awarded 
when a player tackles the quarterback behind the line of scrimmage before he has thrown 
a pass. Id. 
6 Dingus, supra note 1. 
7 Id.; see also Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Demand for Jury Trial Class 
Action at 1, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(No. C-14-2324) [hereinafter Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint]. 
8 Dingus, supra note 1; Dent Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7,  
at 28. 
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subsequently returned to the field.9 He recalls playing the last pre-
season game of that year on so many drugs that he could barely  
remember playing at all.10 This was Dent’s first encounter with 
NFL’s pain management culture—one that encouraged the use of 
pills and painkillers to keep players performing for their teams.11 
Throughout Dent’s career, team doctors and trainers continued 
to provide him with pain medication so he would return to the field 
despite severe injuries.12 For instance during a game in Seattle in 
1990, Dent suffered a broken bone in his foot.13 Team doctors told 
him that he would require surgery, but no further damage could be 
done if he continued playing on the injury.14 Trusting his doctors, he 
followed their advice and played the final eight weeks of the season 
aided by a steady diet of pills and repeated injections of painkillers.15 
Dent now has permanent nerve damage in the foot.16 Dent addition-
ally suffers from an enlarged heart, which he claims is due to the 
large quantities of opioid pain medication team physicians and train-
ers gave him during his NFL career.17 
Dent’s experience with opioids and painkillers in the NFL is not 
unique. Many other players whose careers span many decades  
have shared similar stories.18 These experiences form the basis of 
two player lawsuits, Dent v. National Football League in which 
Richard Dent was the lead plaintiff, and Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, 
LLC, et al.19 Despite these harrowing tales, the NFL has not done 
enough to address the concerns raised over its culture of opioid and 
painkiller abuse. 
 
9 Dingus, supra note 1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 4. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Dingus, supra note 1. 
18 See generally Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 4-7; 
Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, 
LLC, 2016 WL 3566945 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01030). 
19 See Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7; Plaintiffs’ Class 
Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18. 
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In March 2020, the NFL and the NFL Players Association 
(“NFLPA”) entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(“CBA”).20 A CBA is a labor agreement that often addresses a  
variety of subjects, including working conditions, benefits, and sal-
aries, among others.21 This new CBA included provisions meant to 
tackle the pain management problem in the NFL. While the new 
provisions are a step in the right direction, they are inadequate to 
fully address the problem.22 For instance, conflicts of interest in 
player medical care remain a significant concern. Team physicians’ 
financial interest to get players back on the field for their employers 
is often at odds with actions that would enhance players’ health.23 
Similarly, a lack of alternatives, such as medical marijuana, ensure 
that players have no choice but to turn to powerful opioids and other 
painkillers to manage their pain.24 Finally, the retirement benefits 
available to players are limited and often run out or are difficult to 
obtain when players need them most.25 
This Note argues that the NFL and NFLPA must make further 
substantive changes to the NFL CBA and Substance Abuse Policy 
to remedy the dangerous pain management culture the league has 
fostered. Part I outlines the opioid crisis in America generally and 
the NFL specifically. It also provides foundational background  
information on the two player painkiller lawsuits and the NFL CBA. 
Part II discusses the lawsuits and CBA in depth, explaining the dif-
ficulty players face in succeeding in court and the shortcomings of 
the new 2020 CBA. Part III offers solutions to address the opioid 
problem in the NFL, stressing the need to reform medical care,  
treatment options, and retired player benefits. Part III recommends 
policies that limit conflicts of interest in medical care, such as  
increasing team physician independence of medical treatment and 
widening access to and enhancing the duration of retirement benefits 
for former players. 
 
20 See generally NFLPA Approves New 10-Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, N.Y. 
POST (Mar. 15, 2020) https://nypost.com/2020/03/15/nflpa-approves-new-10-year-
collective-bargaining-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/9Z8X-KK5P]. 
21 See infra Section I.C.  
22 See infra Section II.C.  
23 See infra Section II.C.1.  
24 See infra Section II.C.2.  
25 See infra Section II.C.3.  
228 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:223 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Opioid Crisis in the United States 
For the past two decades, America has been in the throes of an 
opioid epidemic and more broadly a pain management crisis.26  
Opioids are natural, synthetic, or semi-synthetic chemicals that  
interact with opioid receptors in the body to reduce the sensation of 
pain.27 Beginning in the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies  
began aggressively pushing doctors to prescribe their patients  
opioid pain relievers.28 The manufacturers spent millions in  
exaggerating the benefits of their opioid painkillers while simul- 
taneously downplaying their risks for treatment of chronic pain29  
despite contrary evidence.30 The manufacturers created websites and 
distributed educational materials which claimed that people who 
take opioids rarely become addicted.31 For example, Purdue Pharma 
sponsored a publication, disseminated by the American Pain Foun-
dation, that stated the risk of addiction in children is less than one 
percent.32 Many doctors, convinced of the pills’ efficacy and hoping 
to help their patients, began prescribing opioid painkillers  
in enormous quantities.33 Other less scrupulous doctors saw oppor-
tunity and established pill mills, practices where they see many  
 
26 Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020) 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/ 
2ZFA-6DQR]. 
27 Commonly Used Terms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/terms.html [https://perma.cc/XL2S-LMSH]. 
28 German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic, Explained, VOX (Dec. 21, 2017, 9:10 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/3/16079772/opioid-epidemic-drug-
overdoses [https://perma.cc/K6NL-MESU] [hereinafter Opioid Epidemic, Explained]. 
29 German Lopez, The Thousands of Lawsuits Against Opioid Companies, Explained, 
VOX (Oct. 17, 2019, 6:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/7/ 
15724054/opioid-epidemic-lawsuits-purdue-oxycontin [https://perma.cc/PA97-5PEW] 
[hereinafter Thousands of Lawsuits]. 
30 Lopez, Opioid Epidemic, Explained, supra note 28. 
31 Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29. 
32 Id. 
33 German Lopez, America’s Huge Problem with Opioid Prescribing, in One Quote, 
VOX, (Sept. 18, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/9/18/ 
16326816/opioid-epidemic-keith-humphreys [https://perma.cc/X8UE-5DFX]. 
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more patients and issue many more painkiller prescriptions than is 
typical, to make a profit.34 
At the same time, distributors continued supplying pills even 
when it should have been clear that the drugs were being  
misused.35 For instance, millions of pills flooded into communities 
with only a few hundred residents.36 In some states, pharmacies 
filled more painkiller prescriptions than there were total people in 
the state.37 In 2012, doctors wrote 259 million opioid prescript- 
tions, enough to provide a bottle of medication to every adult in  
the country.38 In allowing this volume of drugs to flow to these  
communities, drug distributors flouted their responsibilities to  
prevent abuse. Federal regulations require distributors to monitor 
supply chains for suspicious orders to ensure that drugs are not being 
abused.39 Unsurprisingly, in part due to this failure to monitor  
suspicious purchases, America became the biggest consumer of  
opioids in the world by a wide margin.40 
The results of this massive overconsumption of these dangerous 
narcotics were tragic. Between 1999 and 2015, more than 560,000 
Americans died from opioid overdoses41—many thousands involv-
ing the same pills that manufacturers earlier said were safe and  
nonaddictive.42 This enormous death toll led many states and local-
ities to take legal action, filing thousands of lawsuits against manu-
facturers, distributors, and pharmacies for their role in the  
 
34 Id. 
35 Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29. 
36 Id. 
37 German Lopez, How the Opioid Epidemic Became America’s Worst Drug  
Crisis Ever, in 15 Maps and Charts, VOX, (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:51 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/3/23/14987892/opioid-heroin-epidemic-
charts [https://perma.cc/T4AN-JXES] [hereinafter America’s Worst Drug Crisis]. 
38 Kim Painter, Painkiller Prescription Rates Vary Widely Among States, USA TODAY 
(July 1, 2014, 3:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/01/pain 
killer-prescription-rates-states/11898327/ [https://perma.cc/YV4W-UT7Z]. 
39 See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b). 
40 Lopez, America’s Worst Drug Crisis, supra note 37. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.; see also Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates 
[https://perma.cc/VT5H-UKQN]. According to Figure 4, many of the deaths that were 
attributable to opioid overdoses were caused by prescription opioids. Id. 
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crisis.43 Not wanting to face the cost and publicity of trial, many of 
the companies have attempted to reach settlements of tens of  
billions of dollars.44 For Purdue—the company many believe 
sparked the opioid crisis with its OxyContin pill—it has led to  
an $8.3 billion settlement, an agreement to plead guilty to three  
felonies, and bankruptcy.45 Some of the hardest hit states and local-
ities disapprove of such settlements saying they fail to hold those 
responsible for the crisis accountable, indicating that opioid related 
litigation is far from over.46 
Even those individuals who have not followed the opioid saga 
in the news are likely cognizant of it due to its frequent presence in 
popular culture. The opioid crisis has been the subject of at least two  
episodes of the HBO show Last Week Tonight with John Oliver47 
 
43 Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29. 
44 Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, Mallinckrodt Reaches $1.6 Billion Deal  
to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/02/25/health/mallinckrodt-opioid-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/V9Z6-Y5RM]; 
Laura Strickler, Purdue Pharma Offers $10-12 Billion to Settle Opioid Claims, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/purdue-pharma-offers-10-12-
billion-settle-opioid-claims-n1046526 [https://perma.cc/4FR2-BJQ8]. 
45 Jan Hoffman & Katie Benner, Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for 
Opioid Sales, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
10/21/health/purdue-opioids-criminal-charges.html [https://perma.cc/8T9Q-UGV7]; 
Andrew Joseph, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin and Other Drugs, Files for 
Bankruptcy, STAT (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/16/purdue-
pharma-maker-of-oxycontin-and-other-drugs-files-for-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/PXA4-PH58]; Associated Press & Laura Strickler, Purdue Pharma, 
Maker of Painkiller OxyContin, Files for Bankruptcy as Part of Settlement, NBC NEWS 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/purdue-pharma-maker-
painkiller-oxycontin-files-bankruptcy-part-settlement-n1054711 [https://perma.cc/745E-
QWSA]. 
46 Jan Hoffman, Opioid Settlement Offer Provokes Clash Between States and Cities, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/health/opioids-
settlement.html [https://perma.cc/B7P6-B533]; Meryl Kornfield, Christoper Rowland, 
Lenny Bernstein & Devlin Barrett,  Purdue Pharma agrees to plead guilty to federal 
criminal charges in settlement over opioid crisis, WASH POST (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/10/21/purdue-pharma-charges/ 
[https://perma.cc/8H4Z-73HH]. 
47 Opioids, LAST WEEK TONIGHT WITH JOHN OLIVER (HBO), YOUTUBE (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pdPrQFjo2o [https://perma.cc/H9TC-2597]; 
Opioids II, LAST WEEK TONIGHT WITH JOHN OLIVER (HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qCKR6wy94U [https://perma.cc/HYE4-3KEB]. 
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and was covered by Hasan Minhaj on his Netflix show Patriot Act.48 
These shows helped raise public consciousness of the issue, which 
helps ensure greater understanding of this problem.49 Despite this 
increased cultural awareness, many people are likely not mind- 
ful of the impact opioids and other painkillers have had on a pop-
ular form of entertainment itself, one many people enjoy each week: 
NFL football.50 
B. Opioids in the National Football League 
Each Sunday51 millions of Americans tune in to watch their  
favorite athletes and teams play one of the most popular and  
profitable games on earth.52 However, those viewers may not know 
that to stay on the field players, like Richard Dent, have resort- 
ed to using powerful opioids and other painkillers to play through 
 
48 Victoria Kim, Hasan Minhaj: Drug Companies, This Crisis is on You, FIX (Aug. 13, 
2019), https://www.thefix.com/hasan-minhaj-drug-companies-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/5J9T-RMVU]. Netflix is also home to a four-part documentary series 
called The Pharmacist which mixed a story about one man’s fight against the opioid crisis 
with another of America’s addictions, true crime. Sophie Gilbert, The Story  
The Pharmacist Can’t Tell, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
culture/archive/2020/02/netflix-the-pharmacist-true-crime-opioid-epidemic/606604/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XHA-MLBQ]. Another eight-part Netflix series, Painkiller, about the 
origins of the opioid crisis, has been ordered by the streaming giant as well. Joe Otterson, 
Netflix Sets Opioid Crisis Series From “Narcos” Eric Newman, Peter Berg to Direct, 
VARIETY (Feb. 18, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/netflix-opioid-crisis-series-
peter-berg-eric-newman-micah-fitzerman-blue-noah-harpster-1203506588/ 
[https://perma.cc/7QX8-7UYK]. 
49 Andrew Joseph, From Rural Kentucky to HBO, STAT (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/16/john-oliver-sackler-deposition-purdue-pharma/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Q7D-8CWW]. 
50 See generally National Football League, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Football-League [https://perma.cc/2TTA-
4CJ9]. 
51 Monday and Thursday too. 
52 Jon Lafayette, NFL Games Score Big With 5% Boost in Viewership, BROADCASTING 
+ CABLE (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/nfl-games-score-big-
with-5-in-viewership [https://perma.cc/B526-XD7K]; Sourav Das, Top 10 Most Popular 
Sports in the World, SPORTS SHOWS, https://sportsshow.net/top-10-most-popular-sports-in-
the-world/ [https://perma.cc/EXG2-922E]; Michael Colangelo, The NFL made roughly 
$16 billion in revenue last year, TOUCHDOWN WIRE (July 15, 2019), 
https://touchdownwire.usatoday.com/2019/07/15/nfl-revenue-owners-players-billions/ 
[https://perma.cc/T7RP-GQHM]. 
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injuries.53 While extremely effective for treating short-term pain, 
these drugs are addictive and dangerous if not used properly.54  
The reliance on painkillers allows players to perform for the fans 
and their team but comes at great cost to their long-term health.55  
Former players noted how easy it was to get painkillers, saying they 
were handed out like “tic tacs”56 or “candy.”57 Similarly, Eugene 
Monroe, a former NFL offensive tackle for the Jacksonville Jaguars 
and Baltimore Ravens, described players waiting in line outside the 
trainer’s office to get their pregame shot of Toradol, a nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”).58 Players euphemistically 
called it riding the “T-train.”59 While not an opioid, Toradol is a 
powerful painkiller that can have serious side effects when not used 
properly.60 Alongside opioids, Toradol has become a drug of choice 
in the NFL.61 Nevertheless few, if any, players were warned of the 
side effects of these easily available drugs.62 
 
53 Eugene Monroe, Getting Off the T Train, PLAYERS’ TRIB. (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/2016-5-23-eugene-monroe-ravens-
marijuana-opioids-toradol-nfl [https://perma.cc/58NL-ACM8]. 
54 Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-
topics/opioids [https://perma.cc/V7YP-X2HD]. 
55 Sara Bellum, Painkiller Abuse in the NFL, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE  
(Sept. 10, 2013), https://teens.drugabuse.gov/blog/post/painkiller-abuse-nfl-hefty-price-
entertainment [https://perma.cc/8MYZ-UCSJ]. 
56 Sally Jenkins & Rick Maese, Pain and Pain Management in NFL Spawn a Culture of 
Prescription Drug Use and Abuse, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/pain-and-pain-management-in-nfl-
spawn-a-culture-of-prescription-drug-use-and-abuse/2013/04/13/3b36f4de-a1e9-11e2-
bd52-614156372695_story.html [https://perma.cc/E6CB-VB3V]. 
57 Des Bieler, Calvin Johnson Says Painkillers Were Handed Out ‘Like Candy’ to NFL 
Players, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/07/06/calvin-johnson-says-painkillers-were-handed-out-like-candy-to-nfl-
players/ [https://perma.cc/4VJN-AX5T]. 
58 Monroe, supra note 53. 
59 Id. 
60 See generally Toradol Solution, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-
6418/toradol-injection/details [https://perma.cc/X52L-342L]; Toradol, RX LIST, 
https://www.rxlist.com/toradol-side-effects-drug-center.htm [https://perma.cc/HV5L-
RQK9]; Jordan Zirm, How Dangerous is Toradol, the NFL Pain Fix Known as ‘Vitamin 
T’?, STACK (Jan. 22. 2016), https://www.stack.com/a/how-dangerous-is-toradol-the-nfl-
pain-fix-known-as-vitamin-t [https://perma.cc/M6CP-N96B]. 
61 Nicoleas R. Mayne, Derailing the T Train: Curbing the Abuse of Toradol in the 
National Football League, 25 SPORTS L.J. 167, 168 (2018). 
62 Jenkins & Maese, supra note 56. 
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A 2011 survey of retired NFL players found that over fifty-two 
percent of respondents had used opioids and other painkillers  
during their careers.63 Seventy-one percent of those who reported 
opioid use during their playing days also stated misusing them.64 
The overall rate of misuse was thirty-seven percent, which is  
nearly three times higher than the lifetime rate of nonmedical use  
of opioids among the general population of a comparable age.65 
These numbers are shocking, but understandable due to the high  
rate of injury among NFL players. Fifty-six percent of the play- 
ers who reported opioid use suffered three or more injuries during  
their careers.66 Sixty-one percent reported a career-ending injury.67  
The high risk of suffering an injury in the NFL, and near inevitabil-
ity that players will need medication to manage their pain, empha-
sizes the importance of addressing the opioid problem in the NFL. 
The players’ misuse of opioids does not stop once their careers 
end. Former athletes who misused opioids during their playing  
careers were roughly three times more likely to have misused in the 
past thirty days than players who used just as prescribed.68 Similarly, 
seven percent of players reported misusing opioids in the last thirty 
days, three times higher than among men of a similar age in the gen-
eral population.69 This rate of misuse can likely be traced to linger-
ing effects from their playing careers. As a result, only thirteen per-
cent of former players surveyed reported current excellent health.70 
Meanwhile, ninety-three percent of the sample reported living with 
pain.71 Eighty-one percent perceived their pain to be moderate or 
severe, which is over three times higher than the rate of pain reported 
 
63 Linda B. Cottler et al., Injury, Pain, and Prescription Opioid Use Among Former 
National Football League (NFL) Players, 116 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 188, 190 
(2011). 
64 Id. Players who reported that they used more pills or used pills for more days than 
prescribed; misled a physician to get opioids; used someone else’s prescription, or received 
opioids from a teammate, coach, trainer, the “pill guy,” a family member or friend, a dealer 
or the Internet, during their NFL careers, were categorized as NFL misusers. 
65 Id. at 192. 
66 Id. at 190. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 191. 
69 Id. at 192. 
70 Id. at 191. 
71 Id. 
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in the general population.72 Of additional concern, players who  
misused opioids also tended to drink more than players who did not, 
greatly increasing the risk of death.73 
C. The Collective Bargaining Agreement and Substance Abuse 
Policy 
An important instrument that will have a significant role in  
resolving legal disputes surrounding opioid misuse in the NFL is the 
CBA. A CBA is a contract between management and workers that 
covers a variety of subjects, including working conditions, benefits, 
and salaries.74 In 1968, the NFLPA and the NFL negotiated and  
entered into a collective bargaining agreement for the first time.75 
The NFLPA and the NFL Management Council (“NFLMC”), the 
NFL’s sole and exclusive bargaining representative, have negotiated 
and entered into successive collective bargaining agreements peri-
odically in the ensuing years.76 On March 15, 2020, after nearly  
ten months of negotiations, the players approved a new CBA by a  
narrow vote of 1,019 to 959.77 This new agreement, which contains  
new provisions relevant to the opioid issue, will bind the two sides 
through the 2030 season.78 
1. Player Medical Care in the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 
The 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining agreement—and earlier 
agreements—at issue in the Dent and Evans player lawsuits  
 
72 Id. at 191–92. The rate reported in the general population is 26%. Id. 
73 Id. at 191; More than Half of People Who Misuse Prescription Opioids Also Binge 
Drink, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
media/releases/2019/p0611-people-opioids-drink.html [https://perma.cc/G6PY-RP5D] 
(last updated June 10, 2019). 
74 Michael B. Scallan, Painkillers for Profit Gains: How the Ninth Circuit’s Revival of 
Dent v. NFL Could Hold the League Liable for Long-Term Injuries Caused by Its 
Administration of Painkillers, 46 S.U. L. REV. 325, 327 (2019). 
75 Nairi Dulgarian, How the Holding in Dent v. National Football League Tackles 
Collective Bargaining, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 205, 218 (2019). 
76 Scallan, supra note 74, at 327. 
77 Dan Graziano, NFL Players Approve New CBA, Runs Through 2030, ESPN (Mar. 15, 
2020), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28906786/nfl-players-approve-new-cba-2030 
[https://perma.cc/YS2A-ZFPB]. 
78 Id. 
2020] THE OPIOID PROBLEM IN THE NFL 235 
 
sparsely addresses player medical care.79 Article thirty-nine of the 
2011 CBA contains just seven sections devoted to medical care, 
covering a scant three pages of the 301-page document. Section one 
addresses team physicians and medical consultants.80 These doctors 
are all hired and employed by the individuals teams, not the league.81 
In addressing the doctor/patient relationship, the agreement states, 
“each Club physician’s primary duty in providing player medical 
care shall be not to the Club but instead to the player-patient.”82  
Section two lists criteria for team athletic trainers, who are again 
employed directly by the team.83 Section three established an  
“Accountability and Care Committee.”84 This committee is tasked 
with “conduct[ing] research into prevention and treatment of illness 
and injury commonly experienced by professional athletes, includ-
ing patient care outcomes from different treatment methods.”85  
Sections four and five secure the players’ right to seek a second 
opinion and hire the surgeon of their choice, respectively.86 Section 
six states that all players must undergo a pre-season physical exam-
ination administered by team physicians.87 Section seven incorpo-
rates the leagues’ Policy and Program on Substances of Abuse and 
the Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances.88 The 2011 
CBA makes no mention of opioids at all. 
The 2020 CBA includes a significantly expanded article thirty-
nine, covering twenty-one sections and spanning twenty-seven 
pages of the document.89 It contains many provisions discussing  
 
79 For discussions of the lawsuits see infra Section I.A; NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 
NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 171–74 (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFG6-8THX] [hereinafter NFL CBA 2011]. 
80 Id. at 171–72. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 171. 
83 Id. at 172. 
84 Id. at 172–73. 
85 Id. at 172. 
86 Id. at 173. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 173–74. 
89 NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT 214–41 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/ 
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topics covered by the 2011 agreement, including team physicians 
and athletic trainers as well as players’ right to a second opinion and 
the surgeon of their choice.90 Many of the new provisions of article 
thirty-nine are aimed at player safety, including provisions covering 
field surface safety,91 equipment safety,92 head, neck, and spine 
safety, concussion diagnosis and management,93 and a new behav-
ioral health program.94 
The new Prescription Medication and Pain Management  
Program found in section twenty is particularly significant.95 This 
provision establishes a Joint Pain Management Committee to “pro-
vide guidance and establish uniform standards addressing club prac-
tices and policies regarding pain management and use of  
prescription medication by NFL players, including the administra-
tion of certain federally scheduled drugs.”96 The purpose of the  
committee is to create guidelines for the teams’ medical staff when 
administering pain medication.97 These guidelines reflect the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) mandate that players receive the 
FDA drug warning for each prescription provided to them and  
understand the potential side effects.98 The committee is also tasked 
with implementing player education about the use and risks of  
pain medications—particularly opioids—and tracking all prescrip-
tions issued by NFL team physicians.99 Each team is also required 
to hire a pain management specialist, which is a physician with spe-
cialization in one of six areas of medicine specified in the agree-
ment.100 Section twenty also lays out a detailed enforcement proce-
dure for alleged violation of the Pain Management Guidelines  
 
Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AM68-RWET] [hereinafter NFL CBA 2020]. 
90 Id. at 214, 215–16, 220. 
91 Id. at 221–22. 
92 Id. at 222–23. 
93 Id. at 225–29. 
94 Id. at 231–37. 
95 Id. at 237–41. 
96 Id. at 237. 
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99 Id. at 238. 
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established by the Joint Pain Committee.101 These improvements  
address some concerns about opioids while failing to address other 
factors that lead to the opioid crisis in the NFL. 
2. The Substance Abuse Policy and Medical Marijuana 
Both the 2011 and 2020 CBAs incorporate the league’s Policy 
and Program on Substance Abuse into the agreements.102 The 2020 
Substance Abuse Policy prohibits the illegal use of drugs, the abuse 
of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, and the abuse of alcohol; 
the policy identifies these three kinds of drugs as potential  
“substances of abuse.”103 The policy states that its primary goal  
is to assist players who misuse substances of abuse.104 It also sets  
out procedures and protocols for testing105 and entry into the  
programs,106 as well as discipline for violations of the policy.107 
Marijuana is among the substances banned by the NFL under the 
policy.108 Although the 2020 CBA still bans marijuana, the league 
did make some concessions.109 First, the league raised the threshold 
necessary to trigger a positive test from thirty-five nanograms to 150 
nanograms.110 Second, the pre-season testing window was reduced 
from four months to two weeks of training camp.111 Third, players 
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109 Austin Anderson, NFL’s New Marijuana Policy: CBA Changes Rules Dramatically 
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will also no longer face suspensions for violations of the program 
for marijuana, but will still face fines.112 While these changes make 
it much harder to be caught using marijuana, the substance never-
theless remains banned.113 Many players and doctors advocate for 
the league to allow medical marijuana114 as an alternative to opioids 
and other painkillers.115 The NFL’s policy is problematic because 
studies have shown that use of medical marijuana can reduce use of 
opioids in patients with chronic pain.116 
Medical marijuana is unavailable even for those seeking a ther-
apeutic use exemption117 (“TUE”), which is where a player requests 
 
pluses-but-benefits-for-marijuana-users-are-far-down-the-list-224020429.html 
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medication-i-only-think-it-would-help [https://perma.cc/NZ7C-WHFV]; Mike Freeman, 
Banned, but Bountiful: Marijuana Coveted by NFL Players as Invaluable Painkiller, 
BLEACHER REP. (June 30, 2015), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2486218-banned-but-
bountiful-marijuana-coveted-by-nfl-players-as-invaluable-painkiller 
[https://perma.cc/YF9D-C2JD]; Rick Maese, NFL Players Fight Pain with Medical 
Marijuana: ‘Managing it with pills was slowly killing me’, WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), 
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11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html [https://perma.cc/NY2Q-QRAS]; Adam Kilgore, 
Ravens Lineman Pushing Marijuana on the NFL, WASH. POST (June 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/ravens-lineman-pushing-marijuana-on-
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permission from the league to use an otherwise prohibited substance 
for medical purposes.118 Often players seek and are granted TUEs 
for substances that are banned under another league substance pro-
gram, the Policy on Performance-Enhancing Substances, to treat a 
diagnosed medical problem.119 Although opioids and other painkill-
ers are subject to the substance abuse program if used illegally, they 
do not require a TUE when they are prescribed by a physician and 
used accordingly.120 How-ever, marijuana, even with a prescription, 
is not permitted without a TUE, as shown by the case of the Buffalo 
Bills’ Seantrel Henderson who was suspended for using doctor  
prescribed medical marijuana to treat his Crohn’s disease.121 While 
players can seek a TUE for medical marijuana under the Substance 
Abuse Policy, they face hurdles in having it approved. 
These exemptions may be granted when four conditions are 
met.122 First, the medication must be necessary for the treatment of 
the medical problem for which the exemption was requested.123  
Second, acceptable alternative treatments with substances that are 
not banned must have been attempted and failed, or reasons for not 
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using the alternatives must be presented.124 Third, the player must 
have undergone an appropriate evaluation and submitted medical 
records documenting the diagnosis for review.125 Fourth, the player 
may not begin using the substances until the TUE has been 
granted.126 Because opioids and other painkillers are available for 
use by players when they have a valid prescription without a TUE 
and the NFL is generally skeptical of the benefits of medical mariju-
ana, players fail at condition two. 127 As a result, medical marijuana 
is not in practice available to players despite its medical benefits. 
The policy states that the substance abuse “can lead to on- 
the-field injuries . . .  and to personal hardship.”128 It also notes that  
substance abuse has tragically led to the death of several NFL play-
ers.129 However, disallowing alternatives such as medical marijuana 
under the substance abuse policy may drive players to dangerous 
painkillers and opioids to manage their pain, increasing the risk of 
both injury and death. 
3. Retired Player Benefits 
The NFL offers its players a group insurance plan under both the 
2011 and 2020 CBAs.130 Retired players are able to remain on the 
plan for five years after retirement, but only if they have met the 
vesting requirement under the Retirement Plan.131 Under the 2011 
CBA, a player needed four credited seasons to meet this require-
ment.132 Under the new 2020 CBA, a player meets the requirement 
if he has accrued three NFL seasons.133 Players who do not meet this 
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vesting threshold are ineligible for post-retirement healthcare on  
the NFL’s player plan.134 
Article sixty of the 2020 CBA covers NFL Player Disability.135 
The new 2020 agreement reduces disability benefits by about  
twenty percent136 for some players who receive total and permanent  
disability.137 The 2020 CBA has an added offset provision, which  
deducts the amount players receive in social security benefits from 
their total and permanent disability benefits.138 The players con-
ceded to this cut in return for the lower vesting cutoff and pensions 
for pre-1993 players who only had three credited seasons.139 If a 
player qualifies for and takes an NFL pension, the disability amount 
is reduced by that value as well.140 
D. Preemption under Labor Management Relations Act Section 
301 
The CBA is the players’ strongest tool to address the opioid and 
medical care problem. They can negotiate for provisions to be  
included in the legally binding agreement that call for stronger  
protections and guarantees from the NFL that are necessary to  
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combat these issues. But the CBA also provides the NFL with one 
of its best defenses in court. Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (“LMRA”) states, “suits for violation of contracts  
between an employer and a labor organization representing employ-
ees… may be brought in any district court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction of the parties….”141 Courts have interpreted Section 
301 to preempt state law claims that arise directly from a CBA  
or are “substantially dependent” on the analysis and interpretation 
of such an agreement.142 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,143 the 
Supreme Court extended preemption under Section 301 to state tort 
law claims.144 
The test for Section 301 preemption is two-pronged.145 First,  
a court must determine whether the claim involves “rights con-
ferred upon an employee by virtue of state-law [and] not by a 
CBA.”146 If the right asserted exists solely due to the CBA, the  
claim is preempted.147 However, if the right exists independent  
of the CBA, the court must then ask whether the claim is “sub- 
stantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.”148 Courts must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine 
whether the state law claim requires interpretation of a CBA to be 
resolved.149 If the claim cannot be resolved without interpretation of 
the CBA, then the claim is preempted.150 In the context of player 
lawsuits, the claims must be analyzed in relation to the provisions  
of the CBA or CBAs under which they played.151 
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II. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING RELIEF FOR OPIOID RELATED HARMS 
A. The NFL Opioid Litigation 
Two lawsuits filed in the Northern District of California further 
illustrate the extent of the opioid problem in the NFL. They also 
highlight the challenge players face in attempting to affect  
change through the court system because preemption challenges and 
statutes of limitations provide significant hurdles to obtaining  
relief. Additionally, the cases demonstrate the difficulty of avoiding 
harm before it occurs under the current NFL medical care system. 
Players face a pain management culture that encourages them  
to return to play before it is safe, increasing the risk of further  
injury and damage to their long-term health. 
1. Dent v. National Football League 
In 2014, a group of former players filed suit against the NFL for 
its opioid practices. The players alleged that the league had  
intentionally, recklessly, and negligently created and maintained a 
culture of drug misuse, putting profit ahead of player health.152 The 
plaintiffs in the suit comprised individuals who played between 
1969 and 2012.153 Although their individual careers spanned many 
decades, the players had similar stories of playing through gruesome 
injuries aided by powerful painkillers—with no warning of side  
effects or their long term implications.154 The players’ complaint  
alleged that the league distributed opioids, NSAIDs, and local  
anesthetics—often without a prescription and without regard to in-
dividual players’ medical histories—in violation of federal drug 
laws.155 As discussed above, lead plaintiff Richard Dent stated that 
he was regularly given opioids, anesthetics, and anti-inflammatory 
drugs to help him play through significant injuries.156 
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Players on other teams joined the class action lawsuit due to their 
remarkably similar stories. Former offensive lineman Keith Van 
Horne played an entire season on a broken leg with the help of pain 
medication, albeit not purposefully.157 He claimed he only realized 
his leg was broken five years later, having received pills to mask the 
pain in the intervening years.158 Similarly, in 2011 or 2012, Super 
Bowl winning quarterback Jim McMahon first discovered that he 
had suffered a broken neck at some point during his fifteen-year  
career that ended in 1996.159 He believes he suffered the injury  
during a 1993 playoff game; however, instead of holding him out of 
the game, medical staff gave him medication and permitted him to 
go back on the field.160 Moreover, no one from the NFL ever told 
him of the injury.161 McMahon also claimed that during the course 
of his career, team doctors and trainers gave him thousands of injec-
tions and copious amounts of pills without warning him about the 
side effects.162 Another player, Marcellus Wiley, also said he  
received hundreds, if not thousands, of injections and pills without 
mention of side effects.163 In 2014, Wiley was hospitalized and  
diagnosed with partial renal failure at only thirty-nine years old  
and without a history of kidney problems.164 Kidney failure can be 
a side effect of Toradol,165 a drug Wiley says he was given during 
his playing days.166 
In response to the lawsuit, the NFL brought two sets of motions 
to dismiss: the first claimed that the players’ allegations were 
preempted by Section 30, and the second asserted that the  
statute of limitations had run.167 Judge William Alsup of the North-
ern District of California granted the first set of motions to dismiss 
 
157 Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 2. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 28. 
160 Id. 
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162 Id. at 6. 
163 Id. 
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165 Toradol, RXLIST, https://www.rxlist.com/toradol-drug.htm#description 
[https://perma.cc/MMM2-BH9B] (last updated Aug. 1, 2018). 
166 Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 6. 
167 Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C–14–02324, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1, (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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on preemption grounds.168 Judge Alsup examined various provi-
sions related to medical care in the numerous CBAs operative since 
1982 and stated that although they didn’t specifically address  
administration of painkillers, the court needed to interpret the pro-
visions to determine the scope of the NFL’s duties in regards to the 
players’ claims.169 
The players appealed the district court decision to the Ninth  
Circuit.170 Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Tallman found 
that the players claims were not preempted under Section 301.171 
The NFL’s duty to exercise reasonable care in the distribution of 
medications did not arise out of the CBA,172 but rather out of the 
various statutes governing controlled substances.173 The panel held 
similarly for the players’ negligent hiring and retention,174 negligent 
misrepresentation,175 and fraud claims.176 
With the benefit of discovery, the plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint in the district court.177 This complaint alleged that the 
NFL had instituted a “return to play” business plan.178 They alleged 
that the league prioritized profits over player safety, part of which 
included encouraging players to return to the field as quickly as pos-
sible.179 The complaint stated that from the time they are rookies, 
players are told, “you can’t make the Club in the tub,”180 referring 
to players being unable to practice because they are in ice baths  
 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at *7–11. 
170 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 15-15143). 
171 See Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1118–26 (9th Cir. 2018).  
172 Id. at 1119. 
173 Id. (“The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; the Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; and the California Pharmacy Laws, Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 4000 et seq., set forth requirements governing how drugs are to be prescribed 
and labeled.”). 
174 Id. at 1121–22. 
175 Id. at 1123–25. 
176 Id. at 1125. 
177 Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 384 F. Supp. 
3d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. C-14-2324) [hereinafter Dent Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 
Complaint]. 
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179 Id. at 4.  
180 Id.  
246 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:223 
 
recovering from injury. The complaint also stated that team doctors 
and trainers knew they would be replaced if they allowed players  
to rest and recover, rather than rushing them back onto the field  
to bring the club revenue.181 As a result, the complaint alleged that  
the NFL cultivated a culture that encouraged the administration of  
dangerous opioid and painkillers to players in order to bring the 
league maximum revenue.182 
The complaint as amended also included medical records show-
ing the frequency with which painkillers were administered to each 
of the players.183 Often the records were incomplete, with dosages 
missing.184 Documents and team professionals’ statements showed 
that the teams and the league were aware of the mishandling of  
painkillers.185 Bud Carpenter, a long-time Buffalo Bills trainer, 
stated that he witnessed team doctors give players injections with-
out identifying the medication or its side effects.186 One memo- 
randum from the Atlanta Falcons said in part, “there is no evidence 
that the doctor actually knows what medication has been given to 
the players.”187 This lack of care allegedly continued even after the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) investigated the clubs and is 
indicative of the NFL’s laissez faire attitude toward opioids in its 
pursuit of higher revenues.188 
Unfortunately, the new information in the amended complaint 
did not survive the NFL’s subsequent motion to dismiss for  
failure to state a claim.189 Judge Alsup found that the players had  
failed to plead what the Ninth Circuit said was needed of them:  
that the NFL—not the individual clubs—had distributed controlled 
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182 Id. at 5–6. 
183 Id. at 8–38. 
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185 Id. at 56–66. 
186 Rick Maese, NFL Abuse of Painkillers and Other Drugs Described in Court Filings, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/nfl-abuse-
of-painkillers-and-other-drugs-described-in-court-filings/2017/03/09/be1a71d8-035a-
11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.htm [https://perma.cc/9UF7-D6Q6]. 
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substances and prescription drugs.190 The court was not persuaded 
that the “return to play” business plan was enough to transform the 
actions of team doctors and trainers into the actions of the league.191 
Additionally, Judge Alsup found that the plaintiffs failed to allege 
that the NFL had provided direct medical care or treatment to  
players that violated drug laws.192 In doing so, the court rejected the 
argument that the NFL had voluntarily assumed any duty to ensure 
that the clubs complied with the drug laws,193 or that there was any 
special relationship between the players and the league.194 
This second dismissal has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.195 
The same three judge panel that decided the first appeal heard oral 
argument on March 12, 2020.196 Even if the panel sides with the 
players, ample time stands in the way of relief as a trial would still 
need to be held. 
2. Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, LLC, et al. 
In 2015, a second group of former players and family mem- 
bers of former players filed a second suit in the Northern District  
of California.197 Learning from the Dent preemption dismissal, this 
 
190 Id. at 1027. 
191 Id. at 1029. 
192 Id. at 1030. The plaintiffs alleged violations of various federal and state drug laws. At 
the federal level, these laws include the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act (the “Act”), specifically provisions in Title II, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 801, et 
seq.; the Controlled Substances Act; The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”); 
and regulations promulgated pursuant to these authorities. See Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 
Complaint, supra note 177, at 42. 
193 Dent, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 1033. 
194 Id. at 1034. 
195 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Dent v. Nat’l Football League (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 
19-16017). 
196 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15-15143 Richard Dent v. 
NFL, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gvVpIviwKw&feature=emb_title 
[perma.cc/ZMW5-772T]; United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 19-16017 
Richard Dent v. NFL, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2020). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfL9j6Dl-Y8&feature=emb_title 
[https://perma.cc/76AW-CPYV]. Judge Tallman replaced Judge Kozinski on the original 
panel after Judge Kozinski retired. Id. 
197 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, LLC, 
et al. (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:16-cv-01030) [hereinafter Evans Class Action Complaint]. 
248 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:223 
 
time the plaintiffs named each individual team, rather than the NFL 
itself, as defendants to avoid a preemption challenge.198 The claims 
in this lawsuit were similar to those in Dent. The Evans plaintiffs 
alleged intentional misrepresentation against the teams because the 
athletes suffered injuries that the clubs exacerbated through admin-
istering medications to keep them on the field.199 The complaint 
similarly contained numerous accounts of team medical personnel 
providing players with opioids and other prescription painkillers, 
without informing them of the name of the medication or warning 
them of any side effects, so the players could continue to play.200 
The lead plaintiff, Etopia Evans, represented her late husband 
Charles Evans’s estate.201 The plaintiffs claimed that the NFL  
fostered a culture in which club employees—general managers, 
coaches, doctors, trainers, and the players themselves—have a  
financial interest in returning players to the field as soon as possi-
ble.202 Throughout Evans’s career, team doctors and trainers gave 
him pills and injections to help him play through pain.203 After his 
football career, he became addicted to painkillers.204 Charles Evans 
died of an enlarged heart in 2008, eight years after retiring from 
football and without a family history of heart issues.205 Similarly, 
former offensive lineman Jerry Wunsch recalled trainers walking up 
and down the aisles on return flights from away games handing out 
unmarked envelopes full of painkillers.206 Prior to a game in 2003, 
Seahawks head coach Mike Holmgren asked Wunsch if he was able 
to play through an injury.207 After Wunsch replied that he did not 
think so, Coach Holmgren called Seahawks trainer Sam Ramsden 
 
198 See id. at 2–8; see also Sheilla Dingus, Painkiller Abuse in the NFL Part III: A Tale 
of Two Lawsuits, ADVOC. FOR FAIRNESS IN SPORTS (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://advocacyforfairnessinsports.org/current-litigation/nfl-painkiller-
lawsuits/painkiller-abuse-in-the-nfl-part-iii-a-tale-of-two-lawsuits/ 
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and asked, “what can we do to help Mr. Wunsch play today?”208 
Ramsden called team doctors, who gave Wunsch a Toradol shot  
and 750 milligrams of Vicodin.209 When the medication began to 
wear off at half time, he received an additional 750 milligrams of  
Vicodin so he could play in the second half of the game.210 The doc-
tors administered these medications despite the fact that Wunsch 
was already prescribed other anti-inflammatories.211 The “return to 
play” policy led doctors and trainers to give players dangerous  
quantities and combinations of drugs, placing the players’ health 
second to profits.212 
The clubs brought a motion to dismiss based on Section 301 
preemption.213 Unlike in Dent, however, Judge Alsup here denied 
the motion.214 He found that the Evans complaint differed in two 
ways.215 First, the complaint was addressed to the individual clubs, 
not the NFL.216 Second, the conduct alleged in the complaint was 
intentional—rather than negligent—conduct.217 As a result, the 
claims fell into the illegality exception to Section 301.218 The court 
also rejected the club’s motion to dismiss as barred by the statute of 
limitations on the limited record before it.219 The players later filed 
an amended complaint, adding a civil RICO claim220 as well as a 
state law conspiracy claim.221 These claims aimed to address the  
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“return to play” policy, in which teams conspired to give increasing 
amounts of pain medication to players to keep them on the field  
and increase profits.222 
In response, the clubs moved to dismiss the amended com-
plaint.223 This time the court sided with the clubs, finding that  
the four-year statute of limitations had run on the RICO claim.224 
The court also dismissed the conspiracy claims, stating that no facts 
in the amended complaint showed “any agreement or understanding 
between the clubs to adhere to a return-to-play practice or  
policy.”225 As to the intentional misrepresentation and concealment 
claims, the court granted the motion to dismiss for all but eight 
teams.226 The court found that claims had been adequately pled 
against only those teams, but granted leave for the plaintiffs to 
amend the complaint to better plead their claims against the  
remaining teams.227 
The players filed a second amended complaint on March 10, 
2017 to better satisfy the court as to the claims against the other 
clubs.228 The clubs again moved to dismiss.229 On May 15, 2019, 
Judge Alsup granted the clubs’ motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment motion for a majority of the claims.230 The court found 
that the claims of intentional misrepresentation against only twelve 
 
222 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 22, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, LLC, 252 
F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-01030) [hereinafter Evans Second 
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230 Id. at 857. 
2020] THE OPIOID PROBLEM IN THE NFL 251 
 
of the thirty-two teams were adequately pled under Rule 9(b)231 and 
further that only the claims of Alphonso Carreker and Reggie 
Walker survived summary judgment.232 The remaining players’ 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.233 
In an order dated July 21, 2017, Judge Alsup granted the  
clubs’ motion for summary judgment on the intentional mis- 
representation claims against the three remaining defendants.234  
The court found that the workers’ compensation statutes in Califor-
nia, Colorado, and Wisconsin—homes to the three remaining  
defendant clubs—provided exclusive remedies for Carreker’s and 
Walker’s claims.235 This was the final blow to the players’ case,  
ending the Evans litigation.236 
These lawsuits drew attention to the league’s drug administra-
tion practices. The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) launched  
a probe into claims that NFL players had been illegally given  
painkillers to keep them on the field.237 The DEA also investigated 
whether athletic trainers, who lack the proper medical license,  
administered drugs.238 Agents interviewed team doctors and trainers 
from multiple clubs as part of the investigation.239 The NFL claimed 
 
231 Id. at 864. “Rule 9(b) provides, ‘In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.’ Such averments of fraud 
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that it was complying with the law, pointing to a 1994 letter from 
the DEA that stated team doctors could administer drugs on road 
trips.240 However, this ignored the fact that the DEA had warned the 
NFL against this practice in 2011.241 In 2015, the league finally 
changed its drug policy to require the use of local doctors to admin-
ister prescription medication to traveling teams,242 but mishandling 
of painkillers persisted.243 
The two player lawsuits demonstrate the extent and seriousness 
of the pain management crisis in the NFL. Both complaints contain 
harrowing stories detailing players’ struggles with pain both during 
and after their playing careers.244 The most significant cause of these 
issues is the “return to play” culture that pervades the NFL and its 
clubs.245 All actors in the NFL—owners, general managers, coaches, 
and medical personnel—have financial incentives for players to  
return to the field as soon as possible after injury, even if it jeopard-
izes their long term health. Players too are driven to risk their health 
and return to the field early because if they are unable to perform, 
they may be out of a job.246 The result of these strong financial  
incentives is a culture that tolerates, if not encourages, the overuse 
and abuse of opioids and other prescription painkillers among  
players. While the former players in Dent and Evans sought to bring 
attention to and obtain relief for the harm they suffered as a result  
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of the “return to play” policy, the outcomes demonstrate that this  
is a difficult task. 
B. Inability to Remedy the “Return to Play” Culture in the Courts 
Despite the variety of claims the players brought in their suits, 
they have been unable to obtain relief in court. The player  
complaints in both suits persuasively described the “return to play” 
culture of the NFL, but neither prevailed.247 In Dent, the players 
named the NFL itself as the defendant.248 The court found that while 
the league had an incentive to facilitate a “return to play” business 
plan, the players had not shown that the NFL itself had distributed 
drugs negligently or violated drug laws in pursuit of such a plan.249 
They failed to show that the NFL in some way directed or instructed 
teams in their distribution of prescription painkillers.250 In Evans, 
the court dismissed the claims because it was unpersuaded that there 
was an “agreement or understanding between the clubs to adhere  
to a return-to-play practice or policy.”251 
The outcome of these two cases shows the difficulty of  
obtaining relief for the harmful effects of the “return to play”  
culture in court. First, the naturally aligned financial incentives of 
the NFL and its constituent clubs prevent players from demonstrat-
ing the meeting of the minds necessary to succeed on various  
conspiracy claims. The players showed that the incentives of the 
league, club management, and medical personnel are aligned in such 
a way as to create an environment where they hurried players  
back to the field by taking large quantities of prescription  
painkillers. All involved stood to gain from the huge profits the NFL  
generated when players were on the field and performing for  
fans on game day, rather than sitting injured on the sidelines. The  
difficulty lies in showing the presence of an agreement between 
these parties to foster such a culture to succeed on claims in court.252 
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The players had the benefit of discovery in two separate suits but 
were unable to show that the NFL directed teams to administer  
excessive amounts of opioids or that the teams agreed among  
themselves to do so.253 The players likely could not show either  
an explicit agreement to adhere to a “return to play” policy between  
the clubs or direct evidence that the NFL instructed the clubs to  
administer opioids and other drugs in excessive quantities because 
there was none. 
Rather, each club’s individual economic incentives encouraged 
it to administer excessive amounts of opioids, Toradol, and other 
painkillers to players. As a result, team professionals kept players 
on the field to continue accumulating revenue. Since all thirty-two 
clubs have similar interests, there was no need to come to an  
agreement to do something that would individually benefit them.  
Additionally, because the clubs’ incentives were aligned with those 
of the NFL, the latter had no need to direct teams as to how they 
should administer painkillers to keep players on the field and for  
revenue thriving. All involved likely decided to put player health 
second to profits, whether consciously or not, because it was in their 
economic interest to do so. Without evidence of an explicit agree-
ment, claims in future lawsuits that require a meeting of the minds 
are similarly likely to fail—again, leaving the players with no relief 
for the harms they suffered. 
Second, the statute of limitations represents a barrier for play-
ers to achieve recourse from the courts because many of their  
ailments only manifest themselves years after retirement. Once  
the players realize the extent of their injuries and the connection  
to painkillers, the statute of limitations has oftentimes already 
lapsed. As a result, they struggle to even have the opportunity  
to present their claims against the league and clubs in court, as  
occurred in Evans.254 
Workers’ compensation is a third hurdle players face. A judge 
may find that workers’ compensation, rather than the courts,  
provides the proper remedy for players’ injuries, as Judge Alsup  
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did in for Alphonso Carreker and Reggie Walker in Evans.255  
Players may still face difficulty getting relief through workers’  
compensation because of statutes of limitation for bringing claims 
or maximum age cutoffs for claims by professional athletes.256 
Moreover, the NFL has lobbied states to change their laws to make 
it more difficult for players to bring workers’ compensation 
claims.257 Such lobbying efforts resulted in a change to California’s 
workers’ compensation statute.258 Previously, California was one of 
the few states that allowed players to bring workers’ compensation 
claims for cumulative trauma, as opposed to discrete single-event 
injuries.259 This rule is even applied to those players who only play-
ed games in the states as members of a visiting team.260 The new 
California law bars such claims, removing yet another avenue for 
players to get relief. 261 The clubs (and their insurers) may also  
challenge a workers’ compensation award in court, putting another 
roadblock between players and a remedy.262 These obstacles demon-
strate that the courts offer little opportunity for players to obtain  
relief for harm they have already suffered. 
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C. Shortcomings of the New CBA and Possible Preemption 
Concerns 
1. Inadequate Medical Care 
As discussed above, the new 2020 CBA includes a significantly 
expanded article thirty-nine which covers player medical care. 
Among the additions is the new Prescription Medication and Pain 
Management Program in section twenty, which establishes a Joint 
Pain Management committee to set guidelines for club medical  
personnel to follow when administering pain medication to players. 
The committee is also tasked with tracking all prescriptions issued 
by NFL team doctors. Section twenty also requires teams to provide 
player education about prescription pain medication and hire a pain 
management specialist.263 
While the Joint Pain Committee and pain medication guidelines 
are steps in the right direction, they fail to address the “return  
to play” culture. Team management and physicians still have eco-
nomic incentives to return players to the field as soon as possible. 
The CBA states that the Joint Pain Committee guidelines must  
reflect the FDA mandate that players receive warnings about pro-
vided prescription drugs.264 While this sounds like a significant im-
provement, this FDA requirement was already in place during the 
period covered by the lawsuits.265 The NFL physicians still did not 
follow the regulation.266 Providing players with education about pre-
scription painkillers may allow them to make informed decisions, 
but it does not remove the pressure to return to the field quickly. 
Players may still turn to powerful, dangerous painkillers to keep 
playing out of fear of losing their job or roster spot. 
Section twenty does provide an enforcement procedure that can 
punish clubs for failing to follow the Joint Pain Committee  
guidelines and reporting requirements.267 This procedure again  
facially appears like a win for the players, but a deeper look reveals 
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that it is not. While any player, the NFLPA, or NFL management 
council may trigger the procedure by filing a complaint, economic 
incentives will likely prevent them from doing so. Players have very 
little to gain from filing a complaint, but a lot to lose. They run the 
risk of being ostracized by the league or labeled as a troublemaker, 
putting future employment in jeopardy. The NFLPA will likely only 
file a complaint at the request of a player, but for the same reasons 
a player may fear his identity will be revealed. The NFL Manage-
ment Council has even less of an incentive to file a complaint  
because they work for the teams. Additionally, the discipline a club 
would face is light, likely only a fine, which is paltry in comparison 
to what they gain by putting players back on the field with the aid 
of painkillers. 
Finally, section twenty and article thirty-nine overall present  
significant preemption concerns. Under Section 301 of the LMRA, 
state law claims may be preempted if it is necessary to reference a 
collective bargaining agreement to adjudicate the claims.268  
Section 301 preemption has been used repeatedly to defend against 
lawsuits269 brought by players, notably in the well-publicized 
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) lawsuit that ultimately 
led to the $765 million settlement in 2013.270 The increase in the size 
of article thirty-nine in the 2020 CBA—from three and a  
half in the 2011 CBA to twenty-seven pages in the 2020  
agreement—and the addition of section twenty greatly expands the 
universe of issues that will require interpretation of the CBA in  
litigation. For instance, courts will need to analyze section twenty, 
which did not exist at the time of the Dent or Evans lawsuits, to 
determine the clubs’ responsibilities regarding prescription pain 
medication. This will result in the preemption of any state law 
claims related to opioid distribution and handling. Similarly, the 
grievance and enforcement procedure in section twenty also points 
in favor of preemption because courts may find that the player can 
obtain the appropriate remedy through the enforcement process 
without the need for litigation. 
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2. Medical Marijuana Remains Unavailable 
The 2020 CBA also includes changes to the league’s Substance 
Abuse Policy. However, under the new policy marijuana remains  
a banned substance.271 The league did make some concessions with 
its marijuana policy, such as shrinking testing windows, raising the 
threshold for a positive test, and eliminating suspensions.272 How-
ever, the problem remains that marijuana is still a banned substance 
and unavailable as an alternative to opioids and other painkillers.273 
By disallowing alternatives such as medical marijuana under  
the Substance Abuse Policy, the league forces players to rely on 
dangerous painkillers and opioids to manage their pain. The policy 
states that the substance abuse “can lead to on-the-field inju-
ries…and to personal hardship,”274 and also notes that substance 
abuse has tragically led to the death of several NFL players.275  
The Dent and Evans litigations illustrate that dangerous and power-
ful opioids and painkillers, which the policy effectively dictates that 
players use, cause those exact harms. However, studies have shown 
that marijuana can alleviate chronic pain, leading to less of a need 
for dangerous opioids.276 Left without access to these alternatives, 
players are forced to continue to take dangerous prescription pain-
killers that can mask injuries that can lead to further harm. 
The league’s attitude toward marijuana is anachronistic. The 
sole side-effect of marijuana mentioned in the 2020 CBA is schizo-
phrenia, harkening back to the views portrayed in the 1936 film 
Reefer Madness.277 The league justifies its ban of marijuana by  
citing concern over player health while embracing the use of far 
more dangerous opioids and painkillers.278 As long as the league 
continues to list marijuana on its banned substances list, players  
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will continue to face increased risk due to opioids and prescription  
pain medication. 
3. Insufficient Retirement Benefits 
As the Dent and Evans lawsuits show, many former players  
suffer from significant health problems due to painkiller use during 
their careers.279 However, their pain does not end with their  
careers.280 Players who meet the vesting requirement—three years 
under the 2020 CBA—continue to receive health insurance for five 
years after they retire.281 Those players who fail to qualify find 
themselves without any health insurance after they hang up  
their cleats.282 This leaves many players with significant pain from  
injury exacerbated by opioids and painkillers, but no way to  
receive treatment.283 Additionally, many of the players’ injuries  
do not manifest until years later, leaving them without recourse  
due to the statute of limitations even if they had met the vesting re-
quirement.284 Unless they find a new job, secure insurance through  
another employer, or purchase health insurance on their own, these 
players are often left without coverage. 
The players who are unable to work due to injuries may have no 
other choice but to file disability or workers’ compensation claims. 
In both cases, they often face opposition from the league and their 
former clubs.285 The NFL’s disability board denies nearly sixty  
percent of all claims.286 Even those players who successfully navi-
gated the league’s arcane disability filing procedure will receive  
reduced benefits due to the new social security offset provision in 
the 2020 CBA.287 Whereas before players received NFL disability  
payment plus their social security disability, now they receive  
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NFL disability minus the amount of their social security benefits.288  
This new provision reduces the resources available to former players 
struggling with pain and puts a significant burden on the families 
who were counting on those benefits. Additionally, players often 
find themselves facing difficulty in obtaining workers’ compensa-
tion because they must battle their former employers who challenge 
their claims—as of 2013, the league was fighting over 3,000 
claims.289 Players also face statute of limitations and ever-changing 
state laws, thanks to NFL lobbying efforts.290 
The NFL boasts that it has one of the most robust benefit plans 
of any profession, but even still it does not adequately address the 
needs of its former players. 291 There are approximately 18,000  
former players who cannot afford their own health care.292 Many  
of these players have injuries that are a result of opioid and  
painkiller use during their careers.293 Without changes to the bene-
fits offered to former players in the next CBA, that number will  
continue to increase. 
As shown in the Dent and Evans litigation, players face  
significant challenges in obtaining relief for opioid related harms in 
court.294 Statutes of limitation and preemption, particularly in light 
of changes to the 2020 CBA, threaten the success of future litiga-
tion.295 Although the 2020 CBA includes alterations aimed at ad-
dressing the opioid issue, it still falls short and leaves the players 
shouldering the burden of the opioid problem. It does not do enough 
to address the conditions that make it difficult for players to avoid 
harm in the first instance, or through means other than the courts. 
First, team physicians, trainers, and management still face a conflict 
of interest when it comes to player medical care. Similarly, health 
insurance is limited to five years post-retirement and even then only 
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for players who meet the vesting requirements.296 Along the same 
lines, filing an NFL disability claim remains complicated, but still 
successful players will see their benefits cut due to the new social 
security offset provision.297 Finally, former players who file work-
ers’ compensation claims face challenges by their former teams  
that delays, if not totally thwarts, their ability to obtain relief.298  
The NFL and NFLPA must incorporate changes to future CBAs to 
better care for and prevent opioid related harm to both active and 
former players. 
III. REMEDIES 
To fully address the opioid and painkiller problem in the NFL, 
the remedies must eliminate the “return to play” policy described in 
Dent and Evans. They must also provide alternatives to these dan-
gerous substances, as well as aid former players who are  
already suffering from opioid use to obtain the needed treatment. 
The NFL should adopt the following key remedies for current  
players: creating an independent health care system and allow- 
ing players to have access to medical marijuana as alternatives to  
opioids and Toradol. For retired players, increasing access to post-
retirement health care and disability benefits is of paramount  
importance. Due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining 
relief through the courts, it is of vital importance that the NFLPA 
negotiate to have such remedies included in the next CBA.  
Procedural hurdles in court will remain, but addressing the above 
issues in the CBA will reduce the need for judicial remedies by  
preventing harm before it occurs and providing more benefits to aid 
players after their careers are over. 
A. Independent Medical Care 
The “return to play” plan that was the focal point of the Dent and 
Evans litigation shows that conflicts of interest are a significant 
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problem in the NFL’s handling of opioids.299 Under the current  
medical system in the NFL, team physicians are employed directly 
by the team.300 Due to the pressure from their employers to quickly 
return players to the field, even the most well-intentioned team  
physician risks subconsciously putting the player’s health second to 
their own job security. This culture exacerbates the over-prescrip-
tion of opioids and painkillers by team doctors. 
To prevent such results, the NFL and NFLPA should implement 
a system of independent medical treatment for players. A Harvard 
Medical School study, funded in part by the NFLPA, recommended 
increasing the independence of team physicians.301 Under this sys-
tem one set of doctors, the “Players’ Medical Staff,” would be re-
sponsible for providing player treatment.302 These doctors would be 
selected and reviewed by a new “Medical Committee” comprised of 
representatives from the NFL and NFLPA.303 The committee would 
also set physician compensation, which teams would continue to be 
responsible for paying.304 Rather than working for the club, how-
ever, the physicians’ sole responsibilities would be to the players.305 
Medical treatment would be provided without any communication 
or input from the team,306 allowing doctors to only consider the best 
interests of the players. Although they would be compensated by the 
teams, these doctors would only be reviewed and potentially fired 
by the joint Medical Committee, relieving them of the conflict of 
interest.307 Part of this review would evaluate whether the doctor has 
followed all legal and ethical requirements in distributing prescrip-
tion pain medication.308 A second set of doctors, the “Club Evalua-
tion Doctor[s],” would be responsible for evaluating players for 
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business purposes,309 such as administering a pre-employment phys-
ical exam.310 They would advise teams as to the potential usefulness 
of a player to the club311 and the wisdom of offering a contract or 
not, which would be in-dependent of the Players’ Medical Staff’s 
determinations.312 These doctors would not provide any treatment 
whatsoever to players.313 
The NFL has already acknowledged the efficacy of an independ-
ent approach to medical care in another context: concussions.314  
As part of the NFL’s concussion protocol, three independent neuro-
trauma consultants monitor all games from the sideline looking  
for players exhibiting signs of concussions.315 This independent  
specialist exists to avoid the pressures that a team-affiliated physi-
cian may have to put a player back on the field despite concussion 
symptoms.316 The independent physician in the painkiller context 
would achieve the same goal as an independent team physician  
specialist in the concussion setting: removing any potential conflict 
of interest. 
Unfortunately, the NFL issued a response to the Harvard study 
stating that they do not believe there is an “inherent conflict of  
interest” in medical care.317 The NFL listed advances in medical 
care over the years, ironically highlighting the independent neurol-
ogists in the concussion protocol as a key improvement while  
simultaneously stating that there is no need for independent medical 
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care overall.318 NFLPA executive director DeMaurice Smith’s  
statements also indicate that he is hesitant to advocate for any meas-
ure that limits the clubs’ ability to hire their own team doctors.319  
At a symposium at the University of Houston, Smith was asked 
whether the NFLPA believes there is an inherent conflict of interest 
in NFL medical care.320 He responded that the Hippocratic oath was 
sufficient to address those concerns,321 despite the NFLPA’s own 
2013 poll indicating that seventy-eight percent of players do not 
trust team medical staffs.322 He also compared health care in the 
NFL to that of a large university, saying “[w]e would never say we 
need to come up with a committee of students and the university to 
create a neutral health care system.”323 
Negotiations for the next CBA will not begin until the end of the 
decade.324 In the intervening years, the players must garner support 
to implement an independent medical system in the next agreement. 
Such a system is in the best interest of both the players and of the 
league because, first, the risk of player health being put second to 
profits is greatly reduced, ensuring that the players will receive 
proper care and face fewer difficulties later in life. The league will 
also benefit. Eliminating the conflict of interest will reduce potential 
lawsuits about medical care as well as possibly lessen the volume of 
players who will need disability or workers’ compensation due to 
higher quality care. 
B. Medical Marijuana as an Opioid Alternative 
Another change that would benefit active players is permitting 
the use of medical marijuana as an alternative to opioids and 
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painkillers. Some current players, such as star wide receiver DeAn-
dre Hopkins, believe that allowing these alternatives can only 
help.325 Tennessee Titans linebacker Derrick Morgan signed a letter 
in conjunction with Doctors for Cannabis Regulation326 requesting 
that the NFL consider changes to its marijuana policy.327 Another  
recently retired player, Eugene Monroe, has written about and  
discussed how marijuana helped his body recover from the physical 
toll of his NFL career.328 Even prominent owner of the Dallas  
Cowboys Jerry Jones has shown support for dropping the league’s 
prohibition on marijuana.329 
In addition, many former players tout the benefits of marijuana 
for pain management.330 Franco Harris, Todd Herremanns, Ryan 
O’Callaghan, and Randy Moss all support medical marijuana  
use.331 Another retired player, Terrell Davis, said that medical  
marijuana derivative products such as cannabidiol (“CBD”) have  
allowed him to live normally without the need for opioids or 
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painkillers.332 Former Hall of Famer Jack Ham even claims that 
medical marijuana helped him overcome his opioid addiction.333 
Studies support Ham’s claim, finding that treatment consisting 
of a combination of marijuana and opioids may allow for lower 
doses of opioids to be administered, lessening side effects.334  
Harvard Medical School conducted a study in 2015 that examined 
twenty-eight clinical trials of medical marijuana and found strong 
evidence that its use aids in the treatment of chronic pain and other 
ailments.335 Another review of similar studies found that “THC and 
cannabinoids may [even] be superior to opioids in alleviating” some 
pain.336 Despite the promise that these alternatives show, they are 
banned under the NFL’s Substance Abuse Policy.337 
Other professional sports leagues do not take a similarly hard 
stance against marijuana. The Canadian Football League (“CFL”) 
does not test for marijuana at all.338 Along the same lines, the  
National Hockey League (“NHL”) tests a portion of player samples 
as part of its Substance Abuse and Behavioral program, but carries 
no penalty for a positive test.339 Finally, Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”) recently announced that it would no longer test players for 
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marijuana, including minor leaguers who are not a party to the MLB 
CBA.340 These leagues’ approaches to marijuana show that there is 
no inherent reason to test for marijuana. Under a similar policy, NFL 
players would be able to use medical marijuana as an alternative to 
opioids without fear of league punishment. Given the high rate of 
injury341 and the extent of the opioid problem in the NFL, the league 
should adopt one of the above softer approaches. 
If the NFL is hesitant to remove marijuana from its banned  
substance list completely, another approach would be to expand 
players’ ability to receive therapeutic use exemptions. Former  
running back Mike James attempted to obtain such a TUE for med-
ical marijuana.342 The league denied his request, stating that their 
medical advisers did not agree with James’ doctor that marijuana 
was essential for him and that his diagnosis of chronic pain was suf-
ficient for a TUE.343 TUEs for medical marijuana are an uphill battle 
for players because of the leagues’ skepticism about marijuana and 
CBD.344 Players also face difficulty obtaining TUEs because of the 
requirement that no other non-banned alternative treatment will be 
available in order to qualify for one. Because opioids themselves are 
a non-banned treatment available to players, they cannot get a  
TUE for medical marijuana. The NFL should adjust its TUE policy 
to permit players who want to avoid powerful opioid or NSAID  
painkillers to use medical marijuana as an alternative. 
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There have already been small steps forward, such as a willing-
ness to explore alternatives as shown by a recent NFL and the 
NFLPA forum to discuss CBD.345 The two sides are also committed 
to conducting joint research into opioid alternatives, including  
marijuana, under the new CBA.346 With so much scientific evidence 
supporting the use of medical marijuana, and so many current and 
former players showing support, the NFL must adjust its harsh 
stance on the subject. 
C. Increased Retirement Benefits 
The NFL should remove the vesting requirement players must 
reach to qualify for post-retirement health insurance and the five-
year limit on the duration of those benefits. Lifetime health  
insurance would help retired players address the harmful effects of 
prior opioid use during their careers more fully. Many players have 
passionately advocated for such changes to their post-career bene-
fits.347 In a letter to Commissioner Roger Goodell, one group of hall 
of famers promised to boycott future hall of fame induction  
ceremonies until their demands for increased benefits are met.348 
Chief among these demands is lifetime healthcare.349 Removing the 
vesting requirement and five-year limit will allow a greater number 
of players to keep their insurance and get treatment before problems 
become debilitating and lead to further opioid use and dependence. 
Since other leagues have adopted lifetime health insurance for 
former players, this proposal is a feasible solution. MLB players 
have the option to buy into their health insurance plan for life after 
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retirement.350 The NHL, the league with the most comparable  
injury rate to the NFL, offers players who have participated in at 
least 160 games—about two seasons—to continue buying into their 
health insurance for life post-retirement.351 Similarly, the NBA’s 
Retiree Medical Plan provides former players lifetime health  
insurance free of charge.352 All of these plans greatly exceed the  
plan offered by the NFL. While offering free health care to NFL 
players would be costly, the players could buy into the plan just  
as they do in the MLB to offset some of the cost.353 Other revenue 
streams could also be diverted to fund such a plan. Implementing 
lifetime health insurance will take careful planning, but the retired 
players will benefit greatly and the league would also gain an  
advantage by avoiding future lawsuits from players who have no 
other recourse for relief. 
The league can similarly improve benefits in player pensions. 
Pensions, like health insurance, are limited to players who meet the 
vesting requirement.354 By contrast, NHL and MLB players are  
eligible for pension plans as long as they played a single day in the 
league.355 Increasing the number of players who are eligible for  
pensions—a planned benefit for which the NFL can calculate 
costs—may offset the expense of providing other unplanned  
benefits such as disability benefits, of which the total is uncertain 
because the NFL cannot determine now who will need disability 
later.356 This could allow for the new social security disability offset 
provision to be removed in the next CBA, returning players to the 
amount of benefits they received under the 2011 CBA. Disability 
benefits could also be streamlined to allow players to more easily 
access a system that has been described by experts as arcane and 
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difficult to navigate.357 With more players receiving pensions, there 
will likely be less of a need both for disability benefits overall and 
complex administrative processes to secure them. 
Increasing retired players’ benefits will not be cheap, but a 
league that takes in tens of billions of dollars per year can assess its 
budget to procure the necessary funds. Since the players are the ones 
who generate the revenue, they should share in the reward. The NFL 
and the NFLPA have a decade to formulate a strategy to implement 
greater retired player benefits in the next CBA. Given the sacrifice 
the players made in service of the league’s success, their long-term 
health should be among the top priorities during those negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Dent and Evans lawsuits demonstrate the limitations of 
finding relief in the NFL through the courts, and the shortcomings 
of the new CBA to remedy the opioid problem. The NFL and 
NFLPA must take action to address this issue in the next CBA. 
Without the players, there is no NFL. Players devote their lives to 
the league, training long hours during the season and offseason  
so they can perform at an elite level each week for the fans and  
their teams. The NFL’s current failure to address the opioid crisis  
signals fans that they are indifferent to their players’ wellbeing  
as long as profits are high. While the NFL remains popular and  
its fanbase is extremely loyal, participation in youth football pro-
grams has been steadily declining due in part to parents’ concerns 
over the health risks the game poses.358 Super Bowl and regular  
season viewership have also declined in recent years, with some 
speculating that concerns over the league’s handling of health and 
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safety issues are partly to blame.359 Adopting the solutions proposed 
here will protect players who have dedicated their lives to the game, 
while simultaneously alleviating these fans’ concerns. 
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